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A VIEW OF "WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS!"
HERBERT D. LAUBE

"Woe Unto You, Lawyers !"I is permeated with the elusive quality of
nonsense. Its intense, unconventional passion makes it a riddle to its critics.
One reviewer calls it a vicious tirade against the legal profession, a scathing
rebuke of the Constitution and an unwarranted attack upon the law. 2 This
denunciation is in language almost as extravagant as the language used by
Rodell in his inimitable book. In classic phrase, this little volume would
probably be designated a philippic or a diatribe. Technically, it may be called
nonsense. In its technical use, nonsense signifies "whatever cannot be
verified in experience." 3
Rodell insists that the law is a hocus-pocus science and that lawyers are
medicine-men. It is the lawyers who run our civilization and all judges are
lawyers. They are the pseudo-intellectual autocrats 4 of our age. The Law is
a lucrative, powerful, dangerous, high-class racket.5 The lawyer's trade is
built entirely on words. The language of The Law is a foreign language; it
calls a common street brawl a "felony," a "misdemeanor" or a "tort."8 This
jargon, muttered in the solemn voice of a lawyer and backed by the mighty
and mysterious forces of law-and-order, baffles and befoozles the ordinary
literate man. What is the basis of the pusillanimous submission of the
populace to the magic power of old English, Norman French and pig Latin ?T
Every Freudian disciple can readily surmise. It is fear, fear of the unknown,
fear of the policeman.8 That at least is the psychoanalytical secret that Rodell's
lawyer-friend must have bade him to keep locked up within his own skeptical
breast and not to "give the show away."9 Then came "Woe Unto You,
Lawyers !". Rodell knew that it would make every lawyer bristle or snort. 10
His courage has made him a martyr; he is now the victim of misunderstanding.
One critic sees Rodell thumbing his nose at the judges and throwing spitballs at the lawyers with "slapstick, custard pie technique," an exhibition of
'By FRED RODELL, Professor of Law, Yale University. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock,

1939. Pp. xi, 274.
'O'Connor, Book Review (1940) 15 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 268.
*Advice to reader, CARNAI', TIE UNITY OF ScIEN E (1934) 30.
4P. 3.
OP. 15.

"Rodell's purpose was thus defeated when he first introduced the word 'racket'

into satire, whether of Law and Lawyers, or any other thing." Llewellyn, On Reading
and Using the New Jurisprudence (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 418, 425.
OP. 8.
IP. 7, p. 8.
OP. 6.
'P. xi.

lop. 9.
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professorial cleverness."- The pious hope of this critic is that Rodell's
sparkling talents may survive this excursion into the field of sensationalism.
been a lot of fun to write the book and
However he believes that it must have
12
it.
reading
of
fun
the critic had the
How Rodell has puzzled the critics! When the Professor says that the
courts, the lawyers and the law should be abolished, one critic thinks that
the Professor says it with his tongue in his cheek. 13 What is the basis of his
suspicion? The reason is "I know Fred Rodell. He is a great kidder. I
wonder if he is taking us for a ride."' 14 If Rodell is merely taking the
lawyers on a merry jaunt, shall we call him a humorist? That version of this
novel twentieth century professorial sensation presents some little difficulty.
Indeed, a problem of professional propriety is at stake. "Woe Unto You,
Lawyers !"is the product of a student hunch' 5 that the whole legal process
was phony. The teaching of ten eminent men, alphabetically designated,',
fortified his hunch. Surely professorial courtesy would not permit the honor
of an invitation to be tendered to these ten men of distinction to ride in their
idea-sponsored tallyho merely to carry them into the blatent realm of ballyhoo.
7
Is that fun? Is it humor? Is it wit? That is the question.'
It may be humor; it is not wit. Humor is less purely intellectual than wit.
Wit is a product of wisdom. Wit denotes skill, ingenuity, art. Had "Woe
Unto You, Lawyers !" been in any marked degree artful, it is not likely that
the professional critics would have differed so sharply regarding the merit
of the book. In the judgment of one reviewer to make out that all lawyers
are a set of morons is more apt to raise doubt as to the balance of the critic
than it is to convince.' 8 If "Woe Unto You, Lawyers !" is humorous, the
humor seems to have miscarried. Humor is never passionate in the prosaic
aligning of facts to prove that human nature has degenerated to the moronic
level and that the whole racketeering tribe of lawyers exemplifies it. Humor
is sympathetic in its approach. Not infrequently it is blended beautifully with
pathos. Pathos is tender; morons are tough. Yet how strikingly pathos contrasts with bathos!
'Greenbaum, Book Review (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 353, 354, 356,
"Greenbaum, supra note 11, at 353. "This is a lovely project. It is big at once with
belly-laughs and with reform." Llewellyn, loc. cit. supra note 5.
'Hayes, Book Review (1940) 49

YALE

L. J.974.

"Id. at 976.
5P. ix.
"P.

x.

17Some critics have regarded "Woe Unto You, Lawyers I" as satire, comparing it quite
unfavorably with Swift's GuLLmvER's T, AWvLs and Herbert's UNcommoN LAw. See
Llewellyn, mipra note 5; Radin, Woe Unto You, Lawyers: A Review (1940) 38 MIcH.
L. REv. 504.
"Bordwell (1940) 25 IowA L. REv. 394, 395.
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9
Bathos is anticlimatic. One critic says that Rodell's book is anticlimatic.1
The attempt at something constructive is felt to be the weakest part of the
book. If this is true, then it is the end of the book that is the weakest part
of the book. Semantically, there is much to sustain this point of view. For
20
two hundred pages, Rodell blasts away with fury at words. They are the
misty, magic creations that make up the clouds of jargon into which the
lawyers disappear whenever they advise their clients. It is they which make
up the concepts of the Law; it is they which make up the legal lingo of the
judges, the textbook writers and the professors."1 Subjected to their exhausting and contaminating influence for months, the unsuspecting students in our
Law Schools become the victims of this professional verbal barrage. In dazed
confusion the students begin to murmur "mens rea" and "due process"; that
is the symbol of tragedy; it signifies that, in thinking power, they are lost
forever to society.
A single light pierces the dismal gloom. Was it not that "traitor to his
trade," 22 Mr. Justice Holmes, who said, "General propositions do not decide
concrete cases"? But ostensibly, the author does not delve into semantics;
he didn't feel that it was necessary in order to show the silly little picture of the
lawyer leaping from abstraction to abstraction with agility.23 Long, vague,
fuzzy-meaning words are dangerous business. The Law deals in words, long
and vague and fuzzy.
The legal incantations of the Supreme Court of the United States are
ridiculed in Chapter IV.24 They are a lot of noxious nonsense. They are
empty, inept and illogical rationalization based on nothing more substantial
26
than big words. 25 Thus Rodell exposes the somersaulting Supreme Court.
All the Supreme Court does is to toss around sonie abstract concepts. Why
does the Supreme Court do it? The judges are just yielding to temptation;
The Law is so amorphous and indeterminate.2 7 The semantic tirade against
abstractions continues in Chapter V and fatiguingly thereafter ad nauseam. 28
There it is generally shown that The Law is, as Mr. Bumble thought it might

"Id. at 394.
='Montaigne says, "He who establishes his argument by noise..
is weak."
=P. 13.

.

shows that his reason

2P. 11. The same pungent humor which prompted Rodell to characterize Mr. Justice
Holmes as a "traitor to his trade" impelled him to endorse as the best, that ancient caustic
definition of a judge: "A judge is a lawyer who knew the governor." P. 36.
2P. 10.
21P. 61.
2P. 64.

mP. 86.
=P. 79.

="In result the book leaves the reader emotionally and esthetically confused; and ...
instead of being at once funny and stimulating, becomes silly and boresome." Llewellyn,
loc. dt. supra note 5.
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be, "a ass, a idiot." 29 This appears more specifically under the caption of
"No Tax on Max." Here is where the author advises his readers to hang
on to their hats.3 0 The admonition seems as belated as it is irrelevant. This
chapter seems no breezier than the four preceding ones. Max's sad tale had
its origin in Senior v. Braden.31 The whole question concerned a tax: Was it
tax on land? This case merely illustrates the manipulation of legal lingo
by the nation's nine most expert jugglers.3 2 Now it is clear to Rodell that
just because the Supreme Court insisted on applying their silly little abstract
rules on "jurisdiction" to tax, they missed the meat of the problem. The Law
always seems to sink its teeth into the fluff of abstract logic.33 Although the
sinking of judicial teeth into logical fluff is a nebulous concept, still Rodell
is convinced that the "due process" performances of the Supreme Court
are just mystifying munbo-jumbo.
Since the author admits that a personally conducted tour through the mazes
of legal logic is apt to become confusing and tiresome, let us skip some of the
futilities and the irrelevancies of the legal process to look at some Rodellian
flimflam.3 4 Let us admit that lawyers can no more wring certainty out of
abstraction than they can wring blood out of a cauliflower. 35 Let us admit
that the plentiful use of abstract, fuzzy, clumsy words is indispensible to the
hocus-pocus of The Law. Let us admit that most lawyers are blissfully
unaware that what they say resounds with emptiness.36 Let us rush to where
the climax of "Woe Unto You, Lawyers !" would have been, if there had been
a climax, which there wasn't. It is there that the reader's interest rises to the
3
peak of expectancy. It is there that one searches for the semantic secret
to be revealed to the uninitiated, to the great mass of racketeering lawyers. 38
Of course, the reader is quite certain that secret won't lie in the Realm of
Ultimate Truth.3 9 That is only the delusion which has lured astray the
benighted idealist from the days of Plato. If Rodell had had a semantic
secret, he would have put it on Page 222. The secret he had, appears where
2

1P. 102.
,P. 104.
"'And Rodell's chapter on Senior v. Braden is, for example, superb." Llewellyn. loc.
cit. supra note 5.
2P. 131.
=P. 134.
3
1P. 137.
3P.
176.
tm
P. 193.
m"And you can look through every bit of The Law . .. without finding a single rule
that makes as much simple sense as 'Anyone who spits on this platform will be fined five
dollars.'" P. 12.
"'Furthermore, the lawyers-or at least 9944/100 per cent of them-are not even
aware that they are indulging in a racket, and would be shocked at the very mention of
the idea." P. 16.
"P. 222.

WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS!
the secret he pretended to have, ought to have been. The reader must take
it for what it is. What is it?
"It is a question of applying to any set of facts a combination of common sense and technical information and 'justice,' undiluted by ambiguous
principles-and letting The Law fall where it may."
How terribly disappointing! Three abstractions: common sense, technical
information and "justice" are to be combined in their pure form, unadulterated
by the vicious fourth abstraction "ambiguous principles." These are to be
applied to any set of facts. That is the semantic Rodellian secret. Did the
blatant promise of two hundred pages find its fulfilment? If it did not, were
Rodell's pretensions40 fun? Were they "humor"? Yet Rodell says that
The Law is a hoax.41 It is not surprising that Rodell puzzles his critics ! If
his definition of a "lawyer's lawyer" is accepted, clearly Rodell has proven
by his own performance that, upon occasion, even he may be a lawyer's
lawyer.4 What are lawyers' lawyers? "They are walking, talking exhibits
of... their own nonsense."
For this book to have the anticlimax where the climax should have been was
an. unpardonable semantic weakness; it was a fatal weakness. But the
weakest part of "Woe Unto You, Lawyers !" is not at the end; it is at the
beginning of the book where the artless demagogue appears in his primitive
semantic crudity. In the opening chapter Rodell takes lawyers to task for
their inability or their unwillingness to explain their brand of professional pig
Latin to laymen.4 Then he says:
"A doctor can and will tell you what a metatarsus is and where it is and
why it is there and, if necessary, what is wrong with it. A patient.
electrician can explain, to the satisfaction of a medium-grade mentality,.
how a dynamo works. But try to pin down a lawyer, any lawyer, on
'jurisdiction' or 'proximate cause' or 'equitable title'-words which he
tosses off with authority and apparent familiarity and which are part of
his regular stock in trade. If he does not dismiss your question summarily with 'You're not a lawyer; you wouldn't understand,' he will disappear into a cloud of legal jargon, perhaps descending occasionally to the
level of a non-legal abstraction or to the scarcely more satisfactory explanation that something is so because The Law says that it is so."
Any child of Junior High School age could probably meet the test to which
Rodell puts the doctor. If he can't, a few minutes with his dictionary will
"The trade has acquired academic pretensions, and those citadels of logical legerdemain
known as law schools are now the incubators of The Law. . . . Once the professional
gibberish-jugglers have proceeded beyond the training stage, it is almost always too late.
They have to be caught young-in-The-Law to be turned into disciples--or heretics." P. 206.
'Pp. 18, 41.
'Pp. 196, 197.
'"P. 8.
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give him adequate aid, even pictorial assistance, in learning about the
metatarsus. Many a High School boy in Physics can amply demonstrate how
a dynamo works. Either test is fairly simple. The reason is that the
metatarsus and the dynamo are the symbols of tangible things. But when he
tests the lawyer, Rodell sneaks into the field of intangibility-into "jurisdiction," "proximate cause" and "equitable title"--for the purpose of deriding
the "racketeer." Was it chicanery? If he did it deliberately, it is a cheap type
of professorial trickery. 44 If he did it unconsciously all later editions of
"Woe Unto You, Lawyers !" ought to correct this elementary semantic error.
Certainly, to the semanticist, to the psychologist and to the man of the street,
the metatarsus and "proximate cause" or "equitable title" or "jurisdiction"
are not on the same level of abstraction. Let him ask the doctor what
"insanity" is, let him ask the electrician what "electricity" is, before the next
edition of "Woe Unto You, Lawyers !" appears, that the layman may get some
idea of the sound of their jargon at its non-vocational level of abstraction.
One able critic believes Rodell's onslaught has been misdirected. 45 His
prophecy that the improvement of The Law will not be effected by the fiery
curses that Professor Rodell has loosened,°will probably find its justification
in experience. 46 As a satire, the verdict of time may or may not rank "Woe
Unto You, Lawyers !" with "Gulliver's Travels."'47 Certainly, today, there
are few lawyers who would look with envy upon the doubtful distinction
which this professorial performance achieves. 48 "Woe Unto You, Lawyers !"
gives credence to a pessimistic observation once made by William James. 49
"The natural enemy of any subject is the professor thereof." 50
""His satire rests at once on uncertainty and chicanery." Llewellyn, loc. cit. sutpra note 5.
"Radin, supra note 17, at 505.
"Id. at 507.
'See sipra note 17.
'Pound, The Economic Interpretationand the Law of Torts (1940) 53 HARv. L. REv.
365, 367 n. 3, citing St. Paul: 1 Timothy 1, 6-8.
"CHUGERMAN, WARD, THE AMERICAN AaRSTO-E (1939) 48.
'Today, laymen suspect that there are a few writers who are chanting a "chorus of

hate" against lawyers.

Some of these chanters are of non-legal antecedents.

The Lawyer's Place in the Community (1940) 5 Doc-r 4078.
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